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## ETHNO-RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS AND THE CHANGING NATURE OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS IN THE JOS TOWN, PLATEAU STATE, 2000 – 2010.

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### ABSTRACT

The Jos Plateau entered the 21<sup>st</sup> century with the rather unfortunate shift from the “Home of Peace and Tourism” to the theatre of multi-dimensional (political, ethnic and religious) conflicts. These were characterized by large scale destruction of lives and property. Consequently, population responses to insecurity have ranged from relocation outside the boundaries of Plateau State to internal shifting from the zone of insecurity to the relatively safer locations, individually or collectively organized either by government or concerned agencies. This paper examines the phenomenon of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) on the Jos Plateau, with focus on the Jos Town between 2000 and 2010. In this direction, attention is directed to the socio-economic conditions which confront the IDPs, with particular reference to problem of adjustment to the rather unfamiliar environment, feeding, accommodation, productive engagement, children’s education, cohesiveness or otherwise of families and gender relations. The method adopted in this research involved the use of carefully prepared questionnaire, administered in the field. In this direction, questions were directed to selected individual IDP’s on the basis of age, status, gender and profession. Responses from these categories of informants were matched with the few existing written sources for corroboration. The findings showed that the IDP’s were exposed to rather strange environments which offered serious socio-economic challenges, reducing the statuses of bread-winners to bread-beggars.

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**Keywords:** *Ethno-Religious, Conflicts, Socio-Economic Status, Internally Displaced Persons*

## **INTRODUCTION**

The Jos Plateau is located almost at the centre of Nigeria i.e between Latitudes 6°N and 14°N and Longitudes 3°E and 10°E R.N. York (1978:1-24). Plateau State has been known for its heterogeneity with respect to ethnicity, cultural backgrounds and social groupings. The largest concentration of these ethnic groups are found in Jos the capital city of Plateau State. Indeed, the Jos town can be described as a “mini Nigeria”, with all the ethnic groups in the country represented.

Several factors have contributed to the growth and development of the Jos town, thereby attracting people of different socio-cultural, linguistic and religious backgrounds. This phenomenon has led to the creation of a unique diversity in the social configuration of the area. A.A. Kudu (2001) noted admirably that the striking appearance of hills, a unique network of rivers, streams and waterfalls, and a favourable climatic condition have given the Jos Plateau the advantage of tourist attractions over the rest of the country. Today, almost all the ethnic groups in Nigeria are represented here.

From the beginning of the twentieth century, the Jos city began its phenomenal growth as a result of tin mining activities, and by the last quarter of the century it had become almost impossible to differentiate between an indigene and settler. The peaceful co-existence had fashioned out a unique culture-mix, arising partly from inter-ethnic and inter-faith marriages, and partly from cohabitation and commercial intercourse, and still partly from religious tolerance. This paradigm later on attracted for the Jos Plateau the accolade: “Home of Peace and Tourism”

By the end of the twentieth century, the much-cherished peaceful co-existence had been threatened, and from the twenty-first century, the dominant feature of relationships on the Jos Plateau was hostility and violence, leading to the loss of lives and property. This subsequently generated a “new” awareness, reactivating the existing but hidden identities which now dictated where and among whom to settle. This paper examines the nature of socio-economic status of Internally Displaced Persons in the Jos town as part of the population responses to the violent conflicts on the Jos Plateau from 2000 to 2010. The paper strongly believes that the displaced persons entered a new socio-economic phase in the life, characterized by several challenges.

## **Defining the Concept of Ethno-Religious Conflict**

Ethno-religious conflict by its nature is a complex phenomenon, characterized by the rigid inclination to symbolic elements such as ethnicity and religion, and this makes it a multifactorial phenomenon. This form of conflict is often times manifested in intolerant violent attitude towards other people's religious views, or the eventual rapture of the swelling ethnic animosity, which is often susceptible to elite manipulation for political purposes. When such a situation coincides with some existing deep religious divide, the tendency is for the conflict to assume a combine ethnic and religious dimension, hence the inability to capture both concepts (ethnicity and religion) in one single definition. However, some useful attempts have been made to provide a frame within which conflict can generally be explained. The Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary (1948:239) defines conflict as "A situation in which people, groups or countries are involved in a serious disagreement or argument. A violent situation or period of fighting (armed/military) between two countries. A situation in which there are opposing ideas, opinions, feelings or wishes".

This suggests that conflict is a situation of disharmony within an interaction process most often necessitated by hostile antagonism between competing groups. "Such a clash of interest may occur because the groups involved are pursuing incompatible objectives or they are using incompatible means to pursue these chosen objectives", J.A. Sangosanya and D.P. Sha (2005:4). Both ethnic and religious categories of conflicts are most often defined more by their causal factors than the active hostility involved.

Thus, on the Jos Plateau where both ethnicity and religion have combined to constitute the principal variables in defining the identity of groups, there is a tendency for these variables to determine the nature and pattern of conflict and the propensity to acquire the combined ethno-religious character. Thus: "Ethno-religious conflict is the clash, contention, confrontation... among ethno-religious groups. Ethno-religious conflict stems from an irreconcilable posture with regards to symbolic values to the groups concerned", Aluforo (2011:113).

Arising from the foregoing definitions, and in the context of this paper, ethno-religious conflict could be conceptualized as a serious disagreement, resulting to violent situation, involving different ethnic groups and of different religious inclinations. It is this combination (ethnic and religious factors) most often attended by divergent political gap and

trend of classifying people as indigenes, non-indigenes and or settlers which may explain better the form and pattern of conflicts which have bedeviled the Jos Plateau between the year 2000 and 2010. Thus, the inter-locking nature of these factors (also) gives each one of them (ethnic, religious and political) the capacity to pull all the rest along to create the characteristic ethno-religious complex on the Jos Plateau conflicts.

With the current trend of events on the Jos Plateau, one may ask the question: why, despite the existence of all these factors (ethnic, religious, political), the Jos Plateau has featured among the most peaceful states in Nigeria until in recent times? The best probable answer can be found in the Y.B. Usman's "Manipulation" thesis. Bala (1987) defines manipulation as "Essentially controlling the action of a person or group, without that person or group knowing the goals, purpose and method of that control, and without them being aware that a form of control is being exercised on them at all." He cites several instances where religion has been manipulated in Nigeria. According to him "manipulation of religion aims at having the characteristics of provocation – reaction – counter – reaction, through the agency of the mass media", Usman, (1987).

Indeed, most Nigerian political elites seem to have identified religion as one of the most effective mechanisms which create flexibility in the unsuspecting masses. Thus, in central Nigeria (including the Jos Plateau) where the majority ethnic groups are Christians, while the minority but politically more powerful Hausa-Fulani settlers are Muslims, elite manipulation has produced a highly sensitive environment, where political contest involves members of the two religions, standing on different platforms. From this complex network of factors, it is difficult to single out religion, acting alone to create or initiate conflict on the Jos Plateau. Most (if not all) conflicts on the Jos Plateau do not start from the religious spring-board, but rather manipulated through religion, and this has often been achieved with relative ease where religion and ethnicity constitute strong and non-compromising symbolic values.

### **Conflict on the Jos Plateau and Emergence of Refugee Camps in the Jos Town**

One of the commonest features of conflict is population movements, either some distance away from or within the trouble-zone – which might be relatively safe. According to the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and Cartagena Declaration of 1951, a refugee is a person who, owing to a

well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or owing to such fear, unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country. (UN Convention, 1951:9). The wide nature of the above definition failed to capture similar events within the local context. Thus, the O.A.U. and Cartagena Declaration introduced into the brackets additional conditions as necessary qualifications for refugee status, which now is to include dissidents, target minorities and victims of violence. This now includes all displaced victims of conflict and distances farther away (nationally or internationally) from the conflict zone.

Despite the fact that the United Nations Organization's definition of the term refugees refers to victims of violence "who have fled their countries and sought sanctuary in another, and by the same token, are protected by the host country" UNDP (2003), it has come to attract a rather loose definition, referring to it as anyone fleeing for safety, thus making the two terms "Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons" interchangeable. As stated earlier, the Jos Plateau societies entered the 21<sup>st</sup> century disorganized, confused and scattered in the form of refugees, of three main categories. The first category consisted of those who fled out of the Jos Town and crossed the state boundary into Bauchi State, where they settled at Gumau and Tilden-Fulani, Alubo (2006: 198). This category was made up of mainly Hausa/Fulani Muslims. The second category comprised both Christians and Muslims who fled to officially designated areas or locations, with adequate protection. These camps were mainly at the Schools, Churches, Mosques, the Police Barracks, etc. The third category comprised both Muslims and Christians, who relocated from one section of the Jos Town to another. Their first places of refuge at their chosen sections were the Mosques and Churches respectively, and subsequently some of them were accommodated by neighbours.

Thus, both Christian and Muslim refugees crossed to sections where they formed the dominant populations (S.G. Best 2011:182). At the initial stage they were accommodated in Churches and Mosques, while some enjoyed the hospitality of some individual families which admitted them (refugees) into their households.

Probably the situation which characterized the third category explains the hopelessness of the series of peace settlement efforts by both the government and organizations. Two main reasons account for this

hopelessness. Firstly, unlike in the earliest conflicts, in 2010, as soon as victims fled, their houses were burnt and demolished. Secondly, even if some measure of peace was achieved, victims had no homes to return to. The possibility of ever returning to such locations was finally ruled out when alternative portions of land were made available to most of them to build their houses. This trend deepened the religious factor, giving the conflict a very thick ethno-religion colouration, and created one of the most unpleasant social atmospheres in the Jos town. This is a clear case of segregation of settlement, with the attendant “no-go-area” implication, making free movement almost impossible (Best 2011:183). The emerging “new” settlements on both sides became very hostile zones, and to attempt crossing to one section by someone from the other was considered a misadventure. Such exclusively occupied sections of the Jos town were immediately given new (foreign) names, as shown on table 1 below.

**Table 1: New (Foreign) Names Reflecting Religious Divide in the Jos Town**

MUSLIM AREAS		CHRISTIAN AREAS	
Original Names	New Names	Original Names	New Names
Angwan Rogo	New Zamfara	Alheri	Bethlehem
Bauchi Road	Bin - Ladin Zone	Congo - Russia	Gaza
Gangare	Medina	Jenta - Adamu	New Jerusalem
Angwan Rimi	Afghanistan	Tudun - Wada	Galilee
Zarmaganda	Mecca	Kabong	New Jerusalem

**Source: From Field Interview Conducted Between 7<sup>th</sup> and 14<sup>th</sup> May 2022.**

### **The IDPs and the Challenges of New Environment**

Relocating victims of conflict is an emergency action, giving little or no consideration to the environment in which they are located, provided they are away from the danger zone. Thus, the displaced persons find themselves in a rather “strange” environment, with almost all aspects of their daily life disorganized. Most often is the case where fleeing victims identify locations considered relatively safer, much earlier before the official action. This impulsive action subsequently attracts official response: organizing the refugees in a way that their needs may best be met.

The needs of victims of conflict can be categorized into primary and secondary needs. Primary needs include security, food and shelter, while secondary needs include toilet facility, laundry, bathrooms, healthcare

services, social amenity, etc. In response to the security needs of the people, “the usual response of the government in most conflicts is the deployment of the Police to the IDP camps and the conflict zone”, UNDP (2003:33)

It would be re-called that the Jos Plateau entered the 21<sup>st</sup> century with the unfortunate experiences of ethno-religious conflicts. These were characterized by large-scale destruction of lives and property. The accompanying population responses to this state of affair were the relocations in and outside the state. In the Jos town (as stated earlier), the displaced persons found refuge in schools, churches, mosques, the Police Barracks, etc. At the initial stage, these locations were considered refuge points, after which in a few days’ peace would return and victims return happily home. Unfortunately, the conflicts graduated from one level to another, with increasing intensity, affecting many more people.

**Table 2: Location of IDPs from 2004 - 2010**

CAMP	LOCATION	POPULATION	AREA DISPLACED
Stephaneous Foundation	Zang Commercial Secondary School Bukuru	466	Adamawa Borno and Yobe States
EYN LCC, Jos	Opposite House of Assembly, Jos	520	Adamawa Borno and Yobe States
Kabong (Host Families)	G.S.S. Kabong , Jos	477	
c/o Rev. Ari Mai Sule Biu	Old Airport Road, Jos	7 Households	Adamawa Borno and Yobe States
ECWA Rayfield	ECWA Church Rayfield, Jos	3 Households	Adamawa Borno and Yobe States
c/o Ezra Bawa	Mado Village Tudun Wada, Jos	29 Households	Barkin Ladi and Riyom
Seventh Day Adventist Naraguta A and B	Angwan Jarawa, Farin - Gada, Nasarawa, Rantiya, Jos	197 Households	Adamawa Borno and Yobe States
Favoured Sisters Christian Foundation, Jos	Behind Building Materials Market, Jos	221 Children	School for IDP Children from Age 6 – 16 Within and Outside Plateau State
Kaduna Crisis	Boto, DOSS, Gindiri, Kaduna	7,099	Kaduna, Mangu L.G.A.
Community Town Hall, Riyom	Riyom, Sopp and Sharubutu	73 Households	Sopp and Sharubutu, Riyom L.G.A.
Koro - Fan	Koro - Fan	3,421	Koro-Fan Barkin Ladi L.G.A.
Jama’atu Nasril Islam,	Masalachin Jumma’a	82 Households	Adamawa Borno and

Jos	Jos		Yobe States
House of Recap, Jos	Gangare, Jos	200 Children	Borno and Taraba States
Central Primary School, Riyom	Ra - Hoss, Riyom Town	439	Sharubutu and Rim
EKAN Primary School	Riyom Town	3,080	Rim and Sharaubutu
Vwang Development Association	Vwang District, Jos - South	1456	Dogon Gaba, Bahum, Nakai, Danwal, Wanza, Choll 1 and 2
LCA Bukuru	Gyel B	70	Adamawa and Borno
Kwallack Lock-up Shops	Riyom Town	994	Riyom L.G.A.
Jankwano Camp Angwan Galadima GSS Wase	Wase Wase Wase	993 719 1229	Wase, Tafa and Saluwe Wase, Tafa and Danbiram Kuyambana
Sopp Primary School	Riyom	2184	Sopp, Sharubutu and Attakar
Kwata	Kwata	42	Kwata Village

**Source: State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) Plateau Headquarters, J.D. Gomwalk Secretariat Complex, Jos, Plateau State.**

As refugees finally settled away from the trouble areas, their initial priority was food and shelter. This was particularly so for households, comprising children, pregnant women and infants.

This study has shown that the Churches and Mosques responded much more quickly than government. Both the Churches and Mosques mobilized their members for free-will donations in cash and kind (foodstuff, toiletries, clothes, cooking oil, kerosene stoves, kerosene, etc.) for the victims. The Jama'atul Nasir Islam (JNI) and the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) were very active in this direction.

These efforts notwithstanding, the environment where the IDPs found themselves could not effectively replace their homes. For instance, most of the adult men found it difficult to come away from their homes, and probably never to return. One of them lamented that:

As you can see, we have enough food to eat. The government and some good individuals, Churches and Mosques are trying very much. You can see our children are even playing. Home or away from home means nothing to them as far as there is food for them to eat. But, how can I eat and be happy, when my house is burnt and demolished?  
**(Oral Interview with IDP, 15/04/2002)**



Similarly, a female IDP recounted her sad experience at the camp, lamenting she had four children all living. The fifth one (two years old) was very healthy by the time they arrived at the camp, only to die after two months, (**Interview with IDP, 15/04/2002**).

Probably it did not occur to government that the IDPs were going to be at the camps for a fairly long period. This explains why initial provision comprised of cooked food, fruits, bread, bathing soap, etc, which could be eaten without necessarily setting fire. This was very boring: waking up in the morning, waiting hopefully for someone to bring food, (morning, afternoon and evening) created a sense of hopelessness in the minds of most of the adult IDPs. Most of the lamented (though humorously) that they have lost the sense of time and day. For those at the Favoured Sisters Christian Foundation (all children aged 6-16) "every day is Sunday. We sing, read the Bible and pray every day", (**Interview with IDPs, 18/6/2003**).

In 2002, the spill-over of 2001 ethno-religious crises created waves of IDPs in many more Local Government Areas of Plateau State. Most of the IDPs flooded into the Jos town, thereby making worse the already unfavourable conditions in the existing camps in Jos town. This trend continued, with increasing intensity and by 2010, conditions at the camps had become more stressful. As can be seen in table 2, almost the entire Plateau State had become an IDP camp. This situation found expression in the crises of September 7, 2004, which can be described as the peak of hostilities on the Jos Plateau. According to the report of the *Strategic Conflict Assessment of Nigeria* (2008:66):

Plateau State the Home of Peace and Tourism was shattered, following the Jos Sectarian crises of September 7, 2004. This crises gradually expanded to the southern zone of the state, and later assumed a life of its own.

The influx of huge numbers of IDPs created two fundamental problems among the IDPs, on the one hand, and between the IDPs and members of their immediate neighborhood, on the other. Firstly, the ever-increasing population of the IDPs camps rendered supplies inadequate, resulting in scramble over food and the attendant quarrels. Associated with insufficiency in supplies was also the rather manipulating attitude of

the officials in charge of the distribution of materials. In the Strategic Conflict Assessment report (2008:34), it was observed that:

Federal and State governments provided relief to victims of crises but the management and distribution of relief materials by the government and its agencies are sometimes poor and disproportionate to the number of people affected.

Secondly, the general complaint in most neighbourhood was that some of the IDPs, especially the young boys and girls have constituted some socio-economic threat to members of communities, where the IDPs are accommodated. An informant and a member of immediate neighbourhood complained that:

The younger IDPs offered to do any service that can earn them money. But after doing some washing for you, some of the clothes disappear. Our women have started to accuse us of some affairs with the young refugees (especially the unmarried girls), (**Oral Interview, 20/09/2014**).

Coupled with the above problems is the rate at which most of the IDPs camps, especially the primary schools and community halls have been turned into slums and places for learning all forms of "petty crimes" (stealing, indiscriminate sexual affairs, etc.). Here unrestricted hawking by young boys and girls, which by any standard, maybe described as "under-age" continued well into the later part of the night. The environment has often been littered with all sorts of peel, rotten fruits, human excreta and urine, creating a stinking environment, to characterize most IDPs camps. At evenings, the camps have become meeting points for both boys and girls who never had anything to sell or buy.

### **The IDPs in new Socio-Economic Situation**

It would be recalled that the ethno-religious crises on the Jos Plateau marked the entry of the people into the 21<sup>st</sup> century. This continued to be a major feature of the people's relationships throughout the first decade (i.e 2001 - 2010). Thus, ten years of destruction of lives and properties was enough to push the victims into the socio-economic conditions far

below their peace-time status. The table 3 below shows the enormous damage done on the Jos Plateau society, generally, in terms of lives and property, from 2001 to 2010.

**Table 3: Effects of Ethno-Religious Crises of 2001 – 2010**

S/ N	LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREA	NUMBER OF DISPLACED PERSONS			NUMBER OF DEATHS	ESTIMATED COST OF DISTRIBUTION (N)
		ME N	WOME N	CHILDRE N		
1	JOS-NORTH	2021	3739	4343	1000	3,369,716,404.95
2	JOS-SOUTH	1080	1720	3100	-	680,837,307.00
3	JOS-EAST	45	77	183	-	15,210,000.00
4	RIYOM	250	320	780	-	120,000.00
5	SHENDAM	901	1610	2723	-	646,890,000.00
6	BARKIN-LADI	31	62	180	35	15,000,000.00
7	RIYOM	22	30	55	75	12,205,000.00
8	LANGTANG NORTH	650	1270	2354	-	344,427,000.00
9	QUAN PAN	120	1020	1772	-	260,350,800.00
10	JOS-NORTH	506	1023	29764	49	250,700,500.00
11	JOS-SOUTH	3	6	10	501	5,000,000.00
12	KANAM	16	26	40	49	7,184,820.00
13	MANGU	5	12	21	35	6,718,184.00
14	WASE	782	1463	3033	118	182,480,820.00
15	LANGTANG- NORTH	71	140	138	27	102,350,000.00
16	BARKIN-LADI	360	800	2109	46	270,700,000.00
17	JOS-EAST	25	125	407	12	207,575,000.00
18	JOS-NORTH	4430	9397	13290	-	306,000,000.00
19	JOS-SOUTH	4411	10969	16471	350	320,000,000.00
20	RIYOM	8	55	90	35	90,000,000.00

**Source: State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) Plateau Headquarters, J.D. Gomwalk Secretariat Complex, Jos, Plateau State.**

From the table 3, the active population removed from productive engagement across the state for a period of ten years was about three million people. This represents a significant number capable of inflicting serious bruises on the economy of the state. This moreso when they cut across the three geo-political zones of the state, comprising northern zone, central zone and southern zone. It is interesting to know that each of these zones is endowed with particular crops which are peculiar to that zone, sold and consumed in and outside Plateau State. Thus, taking such a large population away from the farm, and creating a state of perpetual insecurity even for those who remained had a huge implication not only

for the socio-economic status of the individual households affected, but also the state in general. The table 4 below shows the distribution of crop-types across the three geo-political zones.

**Table 4: Distribution of Food-Crops in Plateau State**

ZONE	LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREAS	CROPS PRODUCED
Northern Zone	Bassa Barkin-Ladi Jos-East Jos-North Jos-South Riyom	Acca Maize Millet Sweet Potato Irish Potato
Central Zone	Bokkos Pankshin Kanke Kanam Mangu Wase	Acca Maize Irish Patato Sweet Potato
Southern Zone	Langtang-North Langtang-South Mikang Quan Pan Shendam	Yam Rice Maize

**Source: Oral Interview Conducted from 6<sup>th</sup> and 9<sup>th</sup> July, 2022.**

Although table 4 shows a fair and somewhat balance distribution of food-crop types across the zones, some of the zones have enjoyed the monopoly of particular crops. The southern zone for instance, has been known for the cultivation of yam and rice at commercial levels, attracting buyers from within Plateau State and outside. This has been the main reason which influenced the location of the College of Agriculture in the Southern Zone. Farmers in this zone derive huge revenues from these products, raising their socio-economic status significantly. Similarly, irish potato, though also cultivated in Berom land (Northern Zone), the commodity has come to be associated more with the Bokkos Local Government Area, in the Central Zone. This is a product considered more prestigious, and its consumption by “high class” or affluent individuals, in and outside Plateau State.

Equally important is acca, though cultivated also in the Central Zone, the commodity is more associated with the northern zone. The presence of the Acca Processing Centre in Berom land and Irigwe land demonstrates the commercial quantity of acca produced in this zone. Maize has been a

commodity cultivated in all the zones, with its consumption cutting across both the rich and poor, and the main source of livelihood of the lowest stratum of the society.

We have gone this far to demonstrate two main points. Firstly, the removal of these large numbers from the farm created a general stage of food insecurity to both producers and consumers of agricultural products in Plateau. Secondly, most of these farmers, in addition to building up a strong socio-economic status through the commercialization of their cherished products, have contributed to a great extent, to the revenue-yielding machine of the state. In addition, even the now reduced quantities of these crops had lost ready markets, as insecurity remained high in almost every village.

At the level of the individual victims it is certainly difficult for most of them to immediately recover from the huge losses and assume their former socio-economic status. Table 3 shows that victims have been at the IDPs camps for ten years, some of them have no houses to go, as their houses were demolished. While for some, even if their houses still stand, they cannot go because they were living in areas now considered “enemy zones”. Probably the worst affected by this sudden change in socio-economic status were the household heads, who now dwelt at the IDPs camps with members of their families. The supposed “bread-winner” had been reduced to the status of a “bread-beggar”, day-in, day-out, waiting to be given food by government. Probably the northern zone, where the Jos town is located was devastated more than any zone. For instance, of the about 11,317 deaths, northern zone alone lost some 2,028 people, (see table 3). Connected with the losses in human beings is their effects on the social and economic status of women. Since in most cases, women and children do not fight battles, it can be rationalized that the dead were mainly males, the effect of which suddenly changed the social status of women from wives to widows.

It would be recalled that one major feature of population responses to the ethno-religious conflict on the Jos Plateau, which became very active in the Jos town was the changes in the settlement patterns. Both Muslims and Christians crossed boundaries to settle among their relatively larger sections, resulting in segregation of settlements. This action also affected the commercial activities in the Jos town. Sellers and buyers restricted their activities to markets located within the areas considered to have their dominant religious inclinations as shown on table 5 below.

**Table 5: Restricted Commercial Activities**

ETHNO-RELIGIOUS GROUP(S)	MARKET	LOCATION
Hausa-Fulani Muslims	New Market	Aba-na Shehu
	Yan-Doya	Gangare
	Kwararafa	Sarkin Mangu
Indigenes/Christians	Satellite Market	Rukuba Road
	Gada-Biyu Market	Kabong
	Building Materials Market	Bukuru Road
Both Muslims and Christians	Ahmadu Bello Way	Colonially Centre of Jos
	Farin-Gada Market	Zaria Road
	Katako Market	Laranto

**Source: From Field (Oral Interview), 5<sup>th</sup> – 6<sup>th</sup> June 2022.**

It reached a stage where both Christians and Muslims could no longer trust each other. By the end of 2010, dangerous rumours had begun to go round, that some taxi drivers and motor cycle riders (“going”, “*achaba*”, “*okada*”) were carrying their passengers to “enemy zones”, to be killed silently. This created a situation whereby Christian passengers only patronized Christian taxis and *achaba*, who, in response to this development, adopted the use of gospel music in their vehicles, in addition to the rosary (cross) dangling conspicuously on the windscreen. This was also adopted by their Muslim counterparts, who now played Islamic music and hanged the crest, for easy identification by passengers. This further deepened restriction of free movement of hawkers and widened the already existing inter-ethnic/faith gap in the Jos town, and subsequently affected the main features of effective economic intercourse.

## CONCLUSION

This paper has examined the phenomenon of ethno-religious conflicts on the Jos Plateau from 2000 to 2010. During this period, the conflict became increasingly violent resulting in huge losses of lives and property. Victims responded by fleeing their homes and the environments which had become hostile and therefore unsafe, to relatively secure locations in the Jos town. As the conflict persisted and spread across almost the entire state, waves of displaced persons, now in the Jos town were organized in camps for effective care and security. By the end of 2010 about 3.5 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) had been accommodated in about 23 camps. Their source of livelihood rested almost entirely on the governments, organizations, agencies and individuals. Thus, the displaced persons had entered “new” phase (probably that which they had least

expected) in their lives, characterized by all forms of challenges, including economic, social and cultural disarticulation, which combined to change their erstwhile socio-economic status.

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