

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS ON THE POLITICS AND IMPLICATIONS OF SCHOOL GIRLS ABDUCTIONS IN NORTHEASTERN NIGERIA

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ABSTRACT

Boko Haram and ISWAP are related, yet with significant differences. Using secondary data, the study discovered that these two groups pose major threats to peace, progress and particularly educational development in northeast Nigeria. The abductions of female students in Chibok and Dapchi has some political undertone, similarities and differences; with serious implications on the country's educational and socioeconomic goals. The paper recommended that schools should be well secured, female be given special scholarship, employment opportunities, and international organizations to assist in boosting girl-child education in northeastern Nigeria for personal, national and international development.

Keywords: *Abduction; Boko Haram; Chibok; Dapchi; ISWAP; Northeast & School.*

INTRODUCTION

Abductions of persons involving relations or members of families of politicians, businessmen/women, and sometimes, among the politicians/business tycoons themselves, is not altogether alien in Nigeria. Abductors have often ambushed traders, travelers, pupils/students, politicians, contractors and other of their victims and subsequently demanding ransom or threaten to kill them. The recent twist and adoption of this strategy by Boko Haram/ISWAP, targeting several people and particularly young schools girls has become worrisome and a thing of concern for parents, educationists and members of the international communities. There seems to be an elements of politics in the method used in evacuating the girls, the negotiations; the how and when the abductees were taken, released and integrated into the society. Could abduction be a new strategy for the jihadist? Is there no politics in

the entire process? Why abducting innocent young ladies? Wouldn't such abductions affect the girls' quest for sound education? These are some fundamental posers that should be addressed in the analysis.

Methodology

Secondary source of data was adopted; whereby information from books, Internet, Newspapers, Journal and Conference materials were used for this comparative study.

Evolution and Development of Boko Haram/ISWAP in Northeastern Nigeria

The return to civil rule or democracy in 1999 was greeted with joy, enthusiasm and strong desire for socioeconomic, political and technological advancement following several years of military subjugation and intimidations of Nigerians. Paradoxically however, the opposite was encountered especially due to the ugly trends in some states in northeastern Nigeria where a group called Jama'at al-Hi-sunna Lid Da'awat Wal-Jihad, popularly called 'Boko Haram' originated and is domiciled. According to Kastina, this religious sect's name is a combination of Hausa and Arabic language which is literally translated to mean 'western education is forbidden'.¹ They are Sunni Islamic fundamentalist sect, which advocates a strict form of adherence to the Sharia (Islamic law) and its implementation in Nigeria.²

Originally, the intention or objective of this group was to preach and teach how to practice Islam in the way the prophet handed it over to his disciples. To this effect, they had a School and Mosque in Maiduguri, the Borno State capital as the medium of carrying out their mission.

Date and Founder of Boko Haram

The actual date and the initial founder of the group seem to be in disputes by some scholars and personalities. For instance, Governor Moudu Sharriff of Borno, under whose regime the sects came to prominence, asserts that this group seem to be in existence since 1995 with Mallam Abubakar Lawal as the leader, operating under various names like Ahlul Sunnah Wal Jama'ah Hijira; later Shabbaab, Muslim Youth Organization; Nigerian Taliban; to Yusufiyah sect, to Boko

¹ Kastina, A.M. (2011) 'Boko Haram, Nigeria and Sub-regional Security' *Nigerian Journal of International Affairs, Lagos, Vol. 37, No. 3, Sept-Dec, 2011*

² David, C. (2001). 'The Rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria'. Retrieved from www.ctc.usma.edu on 10/10/2019. P9

Haram.³ The advocates of this theory disclosed that the first major activity of Boko Haram was in Kanama, in Yobe State before it later moves to Borno state.⁴ Trying to establish who that Mallam Abubakar Lawal was proves difficult. The surrounding allegation however was that when Mallam Abubakar Lawal left to continue his education, Mohammed Yusuf took over the leadership of the group.

According to another theory, Mohammed Yusuf is said to officially form the group called Jama'atual Alhi-sunna Lid Da'awat Wal-Jihad, popularly called 'Boko Haram in 2002 in the city of Maiduguri where he established a religious complex that included a Mosque and a School where many poor families from within and across Nigeria enrolled their children. The group continued its activities such as preaching Islam in a more radical way; vehemently speaking against bribery, corruption, injustices in the social or political system. Such teachings gave the group more adherents. Corroborating with the above, Maiangwa, stated that:

The movement was critical of government inefficiency, lack of accountability and corrupt practices which has resulted into unemployment and increase in poverty in Borno state in particular and Northern Nigeria as a whole... On several occasions, the group leader (Mohammed Yusuf) had spoken against Western liberal democracy and the ills it has brought to his own community which according to him, encouraged corrupt leaders to relegate the religion of Islam and perverse justice.⁵

In a juxtaposed however, the political class saw this group and its teachings as a threat to political stability of Borno state and the nation at large, as Mohammed Yusuf's popularity and his teachings got him more adherents among the less privileged population.⁶ Some people perceived his aim and teachings was the establishing a Sharia government in Borno State.

³ Onuoha, F.C. (2010) Small Arms and Light Weapon Proliferation and Human Security in Nigeria. Conflict Trends.

⁴ Yakubu, D. (2014) Sheriff, Ihejirika: Sponsoring Boko Haram? The Politico Volume 4; Number 24, September, 2014 p15

⁵ Maiangwa, J.S. (2014) The Concept of Terrorism in Africa. Nigeria, Pyla-Mak Publishers, Kaduna p115

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Such kind of teachings gradually brought suspicion and tension in the metropolis between the politicians/ruling elites and the ruled, especially the masses over the group's advances. Borno state and northern Nigeria being religious sensitive, made the authorities cautious on the immediate crackdown; but there were some cases of underground arrest since 2008.⁷ The group clash with security operatives in Maiduguri from 26th to 30th July 2009 which led to its leader, Mohammed Yusuf being killed in questionable circumstance while in police custody; death of about three hundred and fifteen of its members; arrest of some its members and the demolition of its properties in Markas; its base in Maiduguri, was the last straw which broke the Camel's back^{8&9}. This was the circumstance that warranted the group to take to violence in the states. Nigerian security operatives were able to silence and halt the excesses of the group then especially in the township and manhunt was mounted on other members.

As an organism and living movement, the group therefore went underground and relocated to the outskirts of the metropolis and gather momentum which made her to resurface on a revenge mission. The group went after members, stations and Barracks of the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) attacking, killing, collecting their weapons and freeing prisoners. At this level, the sects were only after their perceived enemy, the Police and other security operatives. As the situation persists, Borno state, especially Maiduguri became insecure as gun shots can be heard; stray bullets could hit innocent person(s) anytime; more Police Mobile Force were drafted to Borno state.

The year 2010 to 2011 seems to be the incubation and rebirth period for a radical and fundamentalist or militant Boko Haram to become a geopolitical and subsequently national terrorists group. The group now went wild attacking several institutions of the state like Schools; Churches; Banks, Markets; Motor parks and other government buildings, as further explained by Fineman thus:

Boko Haram unexpected resurgence, following a mass prison break in September 2010, was accompanied by increasingly sophisticated attacks, initially against soft

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⁹ Ibrahim, I. Y. (2013) 'Boko Haram Insurgence and its implication for Nigeria Foreign Policy' (Unpublished) A paper presented at Al-Hikimah University, Ilorin

targets, but progressing in 2011 to include suicide bombings of police buildings and the United Nations office in Abuja. The government's establishment of a state of emergency at the beginning of 2012, extended in the following year to cover other states like Adamawa, Borno and Yobe all in northeast of Nigeria, led to an increase in both security force abuses and militant attacks.¹⁰

To justify their incessant attacks, the successor to Mohammed Yusuf, Imam Abubakar Shekau, the leader of the group in a YouTube video released in the year 2012, mentioned three reasons for their violent attacks on Nigerian Government and State:

- a. To avenge the killing of their leader and other members in July 2009 by Nigerian Police;
- b. To avenge the ill-treatment the Christians are meting out to Muslims and Islam in Nigeria; and
- c. To correct the present secular constitution which he described as un-Islamic.

Many states in northern Nigeria like Kano, Bauchi, Gombe, including the Federal Capital territory, Abuja all had their share of the attacks.

As a result of frequent search and arrest of suspected Boko Haram members by security operatives and local vigilante group known as Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) in their Bulabulin Ganaram area in Maiduguri metropolis and environs, the sect members left Maiduguri Township to Sambisa forest. Sambisa Forest was a Game Reserve that shares west Sudan savannah and the southern boundary of the Sahel savannah, located 60 kilometers South-east of Maiduguri. It occupies parts of the states of Borno, Yobe, Gombe and Bauchi states along the corridor of Darazo, reaching other states.¹¹&¹². By 2013, the sect has established its hegemony in the game reserve and forest. Taking advantage of this isolated and peaceful serene atmosphere, Boko Haram recruited

¹⁰ Fineman, G.G. (2018) Nigeria's Boko Haram and its security dynamics in West African Sub-region'' Journal of Language, Technology and Entrepreneurship in Africa. Vol. 9, No1 p114

¹¹ Bodunrin, K. (2014) Inside Nigeria's Sambisa Forest, the Boko Haram hideout where kidnapped school girls are believed to be held''. The Guardian. Retrieved 5 July 2019. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/29/nigeria-sambisaforest-boko-haram-hideout-kidnapped-school-girls-believed-to-be-held>

¹² Mbaya, Y.P. and Malgwi, H. (2010) Species list and status of Mammals and Bird in Sambisa Game Reserve, Borno States, Nigeria. Journal of Research in Forest, Wild life and Environment Vol. 2, No 1 p133

more members, trained them in making and using Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and made itself a formidable force.¹³ &¹⁴

Boko Haram has graduated from being a local insurrectionary group to a terrorist group with international affiliations, whereby she has established links with various terrorist formations like Ansar Dine, Al-Qaeda of Mali in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)¹⁵ To practically confirm its association with foreign terrorist group, on 7 March 2015, Boko Haram's leader Abubakar Shekau pledged allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), headed by Abubakar Al-Baghdadi. Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) originated as Jamma'at al-Tawhid wal-jihad in 1999 and pledged allegiance to Al-Qaeda. ISIL played vital role in the 2003 Iraqi insurgency when western forces supported by United States invaded the gulf region. ISIL therefore proclaimed herself a protagonist of worldwide caliphate. As a Caliphate, it claimed religious, political and military authority over all Muslims and captured many places in Iraq and Syria before it was defeated. This group was also known for its video postage on beheading and other types of executions of both military and civilian population.

The confirmed affiliation/nexus between Boko Haram and ISIL, gave or metamorphosed and upgraded Jama'atual Alhi-sunna Lid Da'awat Wal-Jihad, popularly called 'Boko Haram'to its new status and name as the Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP). This implies that Boko Haram is beyond the shores of Nigeria; it is now upgraded to a West African militant group. Boko Haram militant organization based in north-eastern Nigeria is also active in Chad, Niger and northern Cameroon republics. Some of the impacts and evidences of the group's alliance with more established international terrorist groups were the good quality of snapshots or pictures and video messages the group are posting on Youtube; they now launched several attacks on the military in their bases

¹³ Aju, P.C and Aju, J.A (2018) 'Occupation of Sambisa Forest and Boko Haraminsurgency in Northeastern Nigeria as security threat and Challenges to Sustainable Forest Management'. Global Journal of Science Frontier Research: Agriculture and Veterinary, Vol. 18, Issue 5

¹⁴ Eniangho, J (2017) How Safe is Sambisa Forest Now? Vanguard News, April 20, 2017. <https://www.vanguardngr.com/2017/04/safe-sambisa-forest-now/>.

¹⁵ Fineman, G.G. (2018) Nigeria's Boko Haram and its security dynamics in West African Sub-region'' Journal of Language, Technology and Entrepreneurship in Africa. Vol. 9, No1 p 107

in Baga, Gubio and Lake Chad axis without much fears and collecting several weapons from the military., Global Terrorism Index noted that Boko Haram upheaval in Nigeria has consumed the lives of several people and displaced 2.3 million from their homes and was ranked as the world's deadliest terror group.¹⁶

Paradoxically however, after the allegiance to ISIL, there was perhaps internal friction among the Boko Haram Commanders/fighters and the ISIL leadership on another hand which prompted one faction to break away. On 3rd August 2016, the Islamic State reported in the 41st issue of its newspaper, al-Naba, that Abu Musah al-Barnawi had been appointed as the new leader of their West African branch.¹⁷ Today, there are two different factions of the terrorists group. Al-Barnawi, that is backed and connected to ISIL leads ISWAP, while the initial and most popular one in Nigeria and across the region, Boko Haram is still headed by Abubakar Shekau. Whichever of the group attacks, it is labeled as Boko Haram. Both of them have the same mission of establishing caliphate in Nigeria and beyond; however with some slight differences between the groups were outlined by Hamidu, thus:

Shekau's faction (Boko Haram) take harder lines on who is an apostate Muslim and therefore deserving death while the ISWAP headed by Al-Barnawi seems to be moderate. Secondly, Al-Barnawi considers the population in particularly Borno and Yobe states to be Muslims while Shekau conclude the populations, who don't belong to their sect, are non-believers. Thirdly, Boko Haram in 2014 abducted 276 Chibok school girls in Borno state and release few in exchange with some of its forces/foot soldiers; while, ISWAP in 2018 abducted 110 school girls in Dapchi, Yobe state and returned all, except Leah Shuaribu, who refused to renounce her faith in Christ Jesus (this may attest to their radical and moderate stands of the two different groups). Fourthly, Boko Haram attack indiscriminately, while ISWAP target security forces. Fifthly, Boko Haram seems to be more proactive in

¹⁶ Global Terrorism Index (Measuring and Understanding the Impact of Terrorism, 2017). A Report paper, online by Institute for Economics

¹⁷ BBC World Service News 4/8/2016

Sambisa/Adamawa axis, while ISWAP is along the Lake Chad axis. Both of them are however deadly and had their stronghold in North-eastern Nigeria.¹⁸

Many factors, ranging from None observance of rule of law; Poverty; Unemployment; Absence of Parents; The negative impact of movies; The influence of unpatriotic politicians; Failure to provide democratic dividends to the electorates; Bullying and oppression in school system; Parental insensitivity to the plight of their wards and Bias/Wrong religious teachings facilitates the outbreak of the Boko Haram/ISWAP insurgency in the northeastern Nigeria.¹⁹

Dynamics of the Insurgency

Activities of Boko Haram/ISWAP in and beyond Nigeria have impact on Nigerians of all categories. Formerly, the group restricted its attacks on the police whom they accused of killing their initial leader, Mohammed Yusuf in 2009. Later, other military and para-military personnel became their targets; whom they attack and killed, carrying away weapons and setting their captured members in imprisonment/cells free. The civilian populations were not their target as of then. In fact, some civilians cover them or refuse to expose them while planning to launch attack on the military and para-military in Borno and Yobe states.

The insurgency later included breaking of Banks, attacks on Churches and other business premises. Another move was on the civil population, whom the group says were speaking against them and exposing their hideout and members to the security operatives. Many elders and young men were warned, threatened or killed by some of the sect members for the aforementioned reasons. The entire section of the society became susceptible of attacks from the group and sometimes by the military authorities in the name of searching and apprehending the insurgents hiding in the community. Being pushed out of Maiduguri and confined to the Sambisa forest, which became their stronghold, the insurgency exploited the porous surveillance and some laxities of the security

¹⁸ Hamidu, I (2020) Fallacy: A Major Cause for the Unending Boko Haram Terrorism in North-Eastern Nigeria. *Journal of Social Sciences and Public Policy*. Vol 12, Number 1 p 11&12

¹⁹----- (2017) *Political Science Made Easy (The Companion of University Students)*. Nigeria, GodsWill Publishers, Yola p 105-108

apparatus to move in and out sourcing for food, money and other useful and much desired items. As young men, full of energy, perhaps to meet some of their biological instincts, they planned and moved swiftly and capture the 219 school girls in Chibok, Gwoza LGA in Borno state. Prior to the abduction of the Chibok secondary school girls on April 14th 2014, many students were reported missing in those areas, which observers believed the insurgents forcefully abducted and recruited them as most of the insurgents and the school boys and girls are in the same age grade. The abduction of over two hundred girls in Government Secondary School Chibok validates the earlier assertion, even though the girls could as well be used for other purposes. As if the above was not enough, four years later, Boko Haram/ISWAP strategically went against all odd and abducted more ladies. On Monday 19th February 2018, Government Girls College Dapchi, in Yobe state was attacked and about 110 girls were also abducted and taken to unknown destination and some of them were later returned after a month by Boko Haram/ISWAP members.²⁰

These mass abductions of innocent girls in the two schools, opened another chapter and debate on the prowess, wisdom and strategy of the group on one hand, and the laxity and failure of the state and its security apparatus on the other hand. There were blames, accusations and counter accusations as to what and how it happened; it raised tension, suspicion and arguments in the country as to why, how and what? The attacks of soft targets and going away with girls by the insurgence was one of its latest strange moves that kept not only Nigerians but the entire world amazed about the Boko Haram/ISWAP saga, which observers says, there might be element of politics in the whole scenarios.

Similarities in the Abduction Scenarios

From the discourse so far, the two groups who has similar ideology and philosophy, attacked girls secondary and boarding schools. For instance, Boko Haram attacked Government Girls Secondary Chibok on April 14th 2014 where 219 female students were captured in Chibok, Gwoza LGA in Borno state. After the abduction of the Chibok secondary school girls, ISWAP like Boko Haram, on Monday 19th February 2018, attacked Government Girls College Dapchi, in Yobe State, where about 110 female students were taken away. The attacks by these two groups were

²⁰ VOA News 21/3/2018

on boarding secondary schools where only girls are meant to stay and study in Chibok and Dapchi respectively.

The Boko Haram/ISWAP attacks on the girls' schools and abduction were done in northeast geopolitical zone and precisely in the two most prone states of Borno and Yobe respectively. Prior to these attacks, never was it heard that school girls in such large number were taken away in the history of Nigeria, except in the northeast geopolitical zone, by Boko Haram/ISWAP groups. This Boko Haram/ISWAP new strategy of abductions was first done in two states in northeastern Nigeria, Chibok in Borno and Dapchi in Yobe state respectively.

The two attacks for abduction were both done at late evening/night. Boko Haram attack on the Chibok school girls in Borno state was at night and the ISWAP attack on the girls' secondary schools in Dapchi, Yobe state was also at night. Evening or night is when people seem to be resting or sleeping after daily duties, when the atmosphere is a bit calm and quiet; movement or traffic is reduced; the two groups chose that period. None of the attacks and abductions took place during working/classes hours, but late evening perhaps to escape being seen by the air force or other surveillance gadgets, if any. The night was easier for them to move faster, the abductees could not notice them well enough, nor the way to the insurgents' hideouts.

In the two attacks and abductions, the ladies were taken to the bush, outside rational human being habitation by the insurgents. Boko Haram took their captors to Sambisa forest, while ISWAP supposedly took theirs to Lake Chad axis or somewhere along Nigeria-Chad border, their probable stronghold.²¹

In the two attacks and abductions, there were no report of exchange of gun fire between the Boko Haram or ISWAP fighters and the security operatives in and around the two Local Government Areas. In other words, Boko Haram or ISWAP did not shot a single bullet or exchange fire with the security operatives in the two operations, but just evacuated their victims and went away unhurt. This implies there was either no intelligent gathering technique, no security operatives around or the

²¹ Eniangho, J (2017) How Safe is Sambisa Forest Now? Vanguard News, April 20, 2017. <https://www.vanguardngr.com/2017/04/safe-sambisa-forest-now/>.

reports (if there was) were kept aside and security personnel absconded or the attacks and evacuation were mere drama (script play). These called the integrity and combatant readiness of the security officers in combating terrorism in the country to question.

Further still, and in relation to the above, during these two attacks, no state security operatives were on sight to resist the groups or were in the school to protect the students even though the two states were facing security challenges. This made others to see the nation's political class and security operatives as insensitive, inactive and not combatant ready. How could it be that those schools in the volatile northeast states without any armed security personnel to guard? When it happened in Chibok, nobody thought it could happen, that could be considered a mistake, but why a repeat in the same region, was it just laxity of the security operatives or insensitivity of the political class?

Both the attacks and abductions in Chibok and Dapchi happened under democratic or civilian government. In other words, none of the attacks and abductions took place under military or two party systems which Nigeria had practiced before; but they all happened under political dispensation or civilian regime, with multiparty political system in practice. In both the Chibok and Dapchi abductions, some of the abducted ladies were released or returned and this made their parents and family members to be happy to see and were re-united with their stolen children or family members. For instance, in the Chibok abduction, some of the girls were released by their abductors in exchange with some of Boko Haram members/commanders. In that of Dapchi also, some of the ladies were returned back to the school by their abductors. (No one could actually give the condition of this release or return of the girls as authorities denied any ransom payment).

The political and military leadership, under whose leadership the girls were taken were all accused of negligence and insensitive to the plights of the people by the citizen and the opposition political parties in the country. For instance, when the Chibok school girls were taken, the opposition party, All Progressives Congress (APC) and others accused the Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP) lead administration then of insensitive and a failed government. When the Dapchi girls were abducted in 2018 under APC; PDP and other parties also accused APC led government as incapable of protecting lives and properties of Nigerians as fighting against

terrorism/insurgency was one of the campaign promises of APC in the 2015 general elections. The two abductions therefore open rooms for opposition parties to accuse the ruling party of not doing enough to halt the excesses of the Boko Haram and ISWAP insurgency in the country. In similar development, the Bring Back Our Girls (BBOG), a pro-activists and human right group vehemently stood against the governments for its negligence which led to the girls' abduction and demanded the immediate rescue/release of the abducted girls. Bring Back Our Girls (BBOG) were group of concerned Nigeria across the gender and geopolitical zones that organized rallies, symposia, sitting in fountain garden resort in Abuja to principally pressured the government of the day to work for the immediate release of the abducted school girls of both Chibok and Dapchi. They started the rally when the Chibok girls were abducted under PDP and did same when the Dapchi girls were taken under APC.

President Mahummadu Buhari of The Federal Republic of Nigeria promised to rescue the remaining Chibok girls and the only Dapchi school girl from the terrorists so as to re-unite them with their families, but this is yet to materialize as at the time of this study.

Differences in the abduction scenarios

Boko Haram/ISWAP attacks and abductions of school girls in Chibok and Dapchi have some unique differences in numbers of ways like: Chibok school girls were abducted during the regime of President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, a Christian from eastern part of Nigeria, pure civilian without any military background; while the Dapchi school girls were abducted under the leadership of President Muhammadu Buhari, a Muslim, from northern Nigeria, onetime military governor of northeast and military head of states of Nigeria. This implies that he has military training and should be more aware of security technicalities than his predecessor, the President Jonathan. Politically, Chibok girls were abducted under the watch of People Democratic Party (PDP) at the federal level, while at the states it was All Nigerian Peoples' Party (ANPP). The Dapchi girls were abducted during the reign of All Progressives Party (APC) at the federal and state level in both Borno and Yobe State respectively. The issue of interparty conflicts or disharmony between the federal and states government which could hinder immediate deployment of troops against the insurgents is therefore nonexistent in the case of the second abduction.

In terms of numbers, in the Chibok school girls' abduction, 219 girls were taken away; while in that of Dapchi, 110 girls were taken away by the insurgents. The numbers of those taken were more in Chibok than in Dapchi's abduction.

In the Chibok school girls' abduction, some of the ladies dropped or fall down from the moving vehicle and escaped while in that of Dapchi school girls' abduction, such was not clearly recorded. The news of the abduction of Chibok girls was unimaginable and not believed or reacted to promptly by authorities; either because it was odd, no network in the affected area then, fear of being sacked by the top military and political authorities or until all effort to save the situation proves abortive, before the nation's leaders agreed and reacted. In that of the Dapchi, it was hastily reported and easily believed or accepted, since it has happened in Borno state earlier, the mobile phone network and other media outlets in the country were actively working. In the Dapchi school girls' abduction, the insurgents after a month returned the girls, except Leah Shuaribu who refused to convert to Islam and two others that died due to anxiety and apprehension in their captors' hands. In that of Chibok, the insurgents did not return any of the ladies willingly. While some escaped and returned, some were released by their captors in exchange for some of their captured comrades in the war, while some are still under the custody of the insurgents (alive or married). In the Chibok abduction, one can say that the abducted girls were used by the insurgents to negotiate with the Nigerian authorities to get some of their commanders released in return and others for biological and physiological satisfaction.

In the Dapchi abductions, Leah Shuaribu is the only one still in custody of the insurgents; while in the Chibok, over 80 of the girls are unaccounted for as their where about remain a mystery till date. They could still be alive, married to the insurgents, sold as slave or even killed by stray bullets or in cross fire. In the Chibok school girls' abductions, some of them came back or were released/recovered with pregnancy or little baby due to their long stay with the insurgents. In that of the Dapchi school girls abduction, none of the girls that were returned was said to be pregnant much more of carrying a baby. This is perhaps due to the fact that the Dapchi girls did not stay long time with the insurgents in the bush. While the insurgents brought back all the Dapchi girls except for Leah Shuaribu; in the Chibok abduction, some of the girls were later rescued by the military and vigilante groups, beside the ones released in

exchange of other sect members. In the Chibok case, there were three categories of releases or return: Those who risked their lives to drop from the moving van; those that were officially released by the insurgents and taken to Abuja; and those recovered by the military/vigilante group. Majority of those affected in the Chibok girls' school abduction were Christians or from Christian homes/families as that area is Christian dominated. In that of the Dapchi school girls abduction, majority of the girls were Muslims or from Muslim families/background, as they constitute the majority in that areas.

In one of the video/ Youtube released by Boko Haram, the insurgents sew and clothed the Chibok girls with long gowns, dressing them all in Islamic uniform. In that of Dapchi abduction, the girls were not shown on Youtube or given special dresses before their release/return; Leah was however shown by the insurgents extending her greetings and appealing to Nigerian authorities to push for her release. In that of Chibok school girls' abduction, some of the released/recovered Chibok school girls were taken abroad for further studies by their relatives or some faith base organizations; which serve as an encouragement for the ladies and family. While in that of Dapchi, most parents just change their wards school, others became afraid of going back to school as they were threatened by the insurgents to either marry or stop the western education.

Consequent upon the abduction of the Chibok school girls, some of the girls' parents were said to have died or contracted stress related diseases due to the trauma/shock. Cases of parental death due to Dapchi abduction was not recorded as all the ladies were later returned, except Leah Shuaribu's parents that are obviously traumatized and psychologically disturbed. The showcasing of Chibok girls (among whom were Christian ladies) in an all Islamic attire and the refusal to release Leah, one of the Dapchi abductees because she refuse to deny her faith in Christ Jesus, makes the Christian community to see or think that there is anti-Christianity agenda in the efforts to get the remaining girls release by a Muslim head of states and government.

Implications of the School Girls abductions in Northeast Nigeria

The abductions of the school girls have several implications on the girls and the Nigerian educational system at large. Some of the implications include:

1. States in northern Nigeria that is said to be the backward educationally will continue to be backward, since many young ladies are removed from schools for fear of being abducted;
2. There are and shall be lack of many female teachers, workers and other professionals from north eastern Nigeria, because the females to be trained and to be in offices tomorrow are halted from going to school today by the two abductions;
3. There shall be more female students, teachers and other professionals in township and less of such students and workers in the villages due the fear of not being abducted in the rural or neglected areas;
4. Scholars and female students from other parts of Nigeria may not be applying for jobs or to study in schools in northeast Nigeria due to the fear of insurgents/abductions and this will affect vital exchange of ideas and national integration which educational system is meant to promote and uphold;
5. Researches and exploration in the environments may not have female engineers/technocrats; and even when they are available, it will be done haphazardly or abandoned due to fear of being abducted by insurgents.²²
6. It will be hard for female researchers and explorers to come to northeast Nigeria or the Lake Chad area so as not to be abducted;
7. Government at all levels must have to expend more to re-build girls and other schools destroyed in the northeast and equip same for better teaching and learning and to attract more female students;
8. Some parents may stop their female wards from going to schools especially in remotes areas since the insurgents are critical of it and have attacked it severally;
9. Women or girl-child education enrolments in schools will be reduced as many of them have been abducted by the insurgents in many villages in northern Nigeria, notably Chibook and Dapchi in Borno and Yobe states respectively.²³

²² Hamidu, I & Audu, B (2017) *Insecurity: An Impediment to Educational System in Northern Nigeria*, in Ekong, A et'al (eds), Basic Education in Nigeria, Nigeria, Global Academic Group Online Academic Resources Onitsha p 81

²³ Hamidu, I & Audu, B (2017) *Insecurity: An Impediment to Educational System in Northern Nigeria*, in Ekong, A et'al (eds), Basic Education in Nigeria, Nigeria, Global Academic Group Online Academic Resources Onitsha p 80

10. There is fear, anxiety and uncertainties among and between staff and students in other girls schools in northern states, thereby affecting quality teaching/learning;
11. The number of students' enrolment in other non-formal or religious based schools will or have increased at the detriment of formal education especially for the female;
12. The desire and government policy for robust Girl-Child education in the north will be put in jeopardy; and,
13. Consequent upon the insurgents' attacks and abductions of male and female students, as well as some teachers in other attacks, the Nigerian state may not achieve its educational goals in the immediate near future as expected.

CONCLUSION

The abductions of the innocent young girls by the Boko Haram and ISWAP in northeastern Nigeria were highly unimaginable or thinkable as to how non-state actors could enter a sovereign state to kidnap and escape with its citizens without reprisals or military actions. It is the view of this paper that these two incidences have negatively portrayed the military prowess and technological strength of Nigeria and its security apparatus in the fight against terrorism; as well as sending strong fears in the hearts of parents and young girls on going to boarding schools in northeast. Consequent upon the abductions, no political party can now politicize and accuse each other of gross neglects on the issue of school girls' abductions in northeastern Nigeria; rather, proactive measures are needed to make the region safe and stable for all citizens.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In view of the above, the under listed recommendations became imperative:

Government at all levels should do extra-work to stimulate the desire and assist the female to go back to school in the northeast by giving them special scholarship/incentives;

All boarding schools should be well fortified and security operatives be kept on alert daily as that is the residence of the staff and students while in school;

There should be surveillance gadgets to detect and alert people on dangers several miles away for prompt actions;

Female should be given more job opportunities so as to attract others to schools that will later make them to be useful to themselves and in the society at large;

The Girl-Child education policy in northern Nigeria should be boosted morally, financially and otherwise for more ladies to be in schools or be educated;

Parents should be bold and encourage all their wards, particularly the female to go back to school and so as to become somebody useful to and in the society in the near future;

Northern elites should arise, be responsible and stop the advances of the insurgents as the havoc they are creating in this region has immediate and remote consequences on educational, psychological and sociological well being people and developments in and of the region; and,

International Organizations like United Nations, through its specialized agencies like UNICEF and UNESCO should come to the aid of students in northeast, especially the female folks by providing the necessary educational materials/facilities needed for teaching and learning.

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